The bluffer and the bargain

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The bluffer – Jason Varitek

When the rankings that are used to determine free agency compensation came out, Red Sox catcher Jason Varitek was ranked as an “A” level player – the top level. When type A players are signed by another team, the team who loses the player typically gets either the first round pick or second round pick of the team who signs him (let’s call this team “Yankees” in order to simplify things), as well as a pick that is sandwiched between rounds 1 and 2 (referred to as a sandwich pick). In the case where a team signs several type A players, the compensation can be less – the team losing the highest rated player would get the Yankees’ first round pick plus a sandwich. The team losing the second highest rated player would get the Yankees second round pick, plus a sandwich, etc. (More information can be found on MLBTraderumors.com)

One aspect of free agent compensation is that in order to qualify for the compensation, the player’s old team must offer him arbitration, and he must decline (arbitration is a process where each side submit an amount to a panel of arbitrators. The panel chooses one of the amounts as the player’s salary for the next year – they cannot settle on a compromise amount).

The fact that Varitek qualified as a type A speaks to some of the flaws in the system. Varitek will turn 37 next April, and catchers are not the sort of baseball player who age gracefully. The years of squatting behind the player typically catch up with a catcher in his mid 30s, affecting the quality of his play. This is a cruel fact. Add to this the fact that Varitek was coming off a rather lackluster year in which he hit just .220 with 13 homers – by most measures, it was the worst season of his career. Varitek is the captain of the Red Sox and is an emotional leader, so he does have some positives.

The reason why Varitek was a type A player is due to a good 2007 season (the rankings are based on the last two seasons) and a relatively poor group of catchers that he is compared against.

When the Red Sox decided to offer arbitration to Varitek, it seemed like an obvious attempt to bring him back at 80% of his 2008 salary (a player cannot receive a pay cut of more than 20% through arbitration). His 2008 salary was $10.4 million; 80% of that is $8.32 million). It should not have been hard for the Red Sox to win an arbitration case. In fact, it seemed that the smartest thing for Varitek to do would be to accept arbitration. If he declined arbitration, the team signing him would have to forfeit a draft pick to the Red Sox – and also overpay for Varitek (since he does not appear to be worth $8.32M).

Needless to say, I was stunned when Varitek declined arbitration. He now has two options:

1) Negotiate a deal with the Red Sox. It seems difficult to imagine that he’ll be able to negotiate a salary of more than $5 million per year, especially with the Red Sox holding most of the cards (see option 2)

2) Sign a free agent contract with a team willing to forfeit the draft pick and pay him the money he ways (again, he walked away from a $8.32 million salary for next year). For 11 teams, this would mean forfeiting a first round pick. For 17 teams, this would mean forfeiting a second round pick. For the Braves, this would mean forfeiting a third round pick, and for the Yankees, this would mean forfeiting a fourth round pick (because they Yankees have already signed three higher ranked free agents). Realistically, this limits his options to the Braves and Yankees, neither or whom seem to be jumping at the chance to overpay for an aging catcher. In fact the Yankees already have one aging catcher (Jorge Posada, who will also be 37 next year)

Essentially, Varitek tried to bluff the Red Sox by declining arbitration. While it is true that they would need to find another catcher if they lose Varitek, they could make a move and trade a prospect for a young catcher and then use the compensation picks to replenish their system.

The most likely scenario is that Varitek will be forced to sign a contract with the Red Sox for less than he would have received through arbitration – or he will try to sit out part of next year in hopes that a new suitor emerges.

[Update: there has been some confusion about whether or not a player can receive a pay cut through arbitration. Some sources have said that a player cannot receive a pay cut through arbitration. This is completely false. Others have said that a player can receive no more than a 20% pay cut, which is what I based this post off of. However, this only applies to players who are in pre-free agency arbitration (i.e. players who do not have the 6 years of service time necessary to be a free agent). For this group of players, they cannot receive a pay cut of more than 20% of their last year’s salary or 30% of the salary of two years previous (apparently in an attempt to avoid having teams reduce salaries 20% each year) – although this restriction is waived if the player had won a 50% pay raise in arbitration the previous year. This is outlined on page 15-16 of the CBA – article VI.F.3.c.i-ii.

However, for pending free agents, this is not applicable. Page 72 (XX.B.3) of the CBA clearly states “ … the rules concerning maximum salary reduction in article VI shall be inapplicable …”
So my statement about the Red Sox having to submit an offer of $8.32 million is not correct. It appears that they could have submitted any offer of $400,000 or more ($400,000 is the minimum salary for MLB). However, this does not change my opinion that he would have received more in arbitration that he will as a free agent. It is very unusual for a player to receive a substantial pay cut in arbitration, and I think it is quite likely that he could have gotten $7-8 million (if he had been smart and submitted an amount in this range).

In a report on NESN, Varitek said that he was not aware that other teams would be required to compensate the Red Sox if they chose to sign him (effectively reducing the number of suitors). I find it absolutely incredible that he didn’t know this. Even if his agent (Scott Boras) didn’t mention this to him, you would think someone in his circle of family and friends would be aware. Perhaps he could have had a short chat with Red Sox union representative Kevin Youkilis about his options. I’ll admit that I’m geeky about free agency compensation and such, but it seems crazy that Varitek wasn’t aware of the compensation.]

The Bargain – Andruw Jones

Center fielder Andruw Jones signed a two year deal with the Dodgers worth a total of $36.2 million before the 2008 season. He then proceeded to stink up the joint, hitting just .158 with 3 homers and 14 RBI in 209 at bats. He was dreadfully bad. Then he got hurt and missed most of the season.

The fact that Jones had a bad season wasn’t a huge shock to some people. After all, his 2007 season wasn’t particularly good – he did stumble into 94 RBI, but hit just .222.

Recently, the Dodgers severed ties with Jones. They restructured his deal to pay him the remaining $22 million over the next six years, with no interest. Then they cut him. The Dodgers have a glut of outfielders on their roster and didn’t feel that Jones would be a contributor for them.

Any team that signs Jones will only have to pay him $400,000 for 2009 – the major league minimum – since his salary is being paid by the Dodgers. This seems to be an excellent reclamation project for someone. The downside is fairly small. Jones does want a major league contract (rather than a minor league contract) so it would necessitate a roster move to make room on the 40 man roster. However, it would not necessarily mean losing another player to make room – if a player still has “options” remaining, he could be optioned to the minor leagues without passing through waivers. This would, of course, use up one of the player’s three (in some cases, four) allowed option years.

The possible benefit seems worth the risk, though. Jones is only a few season removed from back to back 40 homer seasons, and he’ll be just 32 in April. His strikeout rate shot through the roof last year (1 strikeout in every 2.75 at bats, compared to one K in every 4.5 AB for his career and one K every 4.14 at bats in 2008). This may point to a problem that is more mental than physical.

In short, I would rather take a risk on Jones and be wrong (and waste an option year on a prospect) than have a division rival gamble on Jones and be right (and get 40 homers out of him). In fact, some teams have some dreadful talent (Pirates, I’m looking at you) that it would seem to be a complete no brainer of a decision.

Things that drive me crazy in sports

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8. Not enough luge on TV. I absolutely love the sport – it is second only to baseball. Yet, I get to see it only once every four years.

7. Prices. Seriously, toss me some sort of a bone. The ticket prices are absurd, I pay to park, and concessions and gift shops are overpriced. Some stadiums have all-you-cam-eat-without-puking sections, which is nice. Some places have family deals (4 tickets, 4 dogs, 4 sodas), but usually only for less popular games. Really, do a bit more. If I’m paying $75 a ticket for my family of 4, let me park for free. Don’t make me buy overprice preseason tickets as part of a season ticket package.

6. College athletes who want to get paid. First of all, you are getting paid. Full tuition, room and board, books. I would have loved to have gotten these benefits from my college job. Second, the vast majority of athletic departments do NOT make a profit. The majority of schools are not getting rich on athletics; they are breaking even or losing money. Sure, some sports might make a profit, but do you really want to pay a bad QB and not pay an All-American volleyball player, simply because football makes money and volleyball doesn’t?

5. Efforts to shorten games. MLB has done this. NCAA football has done this. I like sports. Why would I want to shorten the games? The NCAA’s tactics resulted in fewer plays per game, which is a loss for the fans. If I am a roller coaster fan, do I want to see the amusement parks shorten the ride time? No, of course not.

4. Lack of NCAA football playoff. Some of the NCAA’s arguments might make more sense if there wasn’t a playoff in every other division. It’s OK for 1-AA (FCS) players to play all the extra games, miss class time, etc, but it’s not OK for 1-A (FBS) players?

3. Baseball teams are not allowed to trade their draft picks. The results in players often being chosen based on signability rather than talent. In other words, I use the #1 pick to draft the 4th best player, because he will sign for a reasonable amount. Why not allow me to trade my pick the the team with the #4 pick. This allows them to grab a guy they wouldn’t have been able to get at #4. At #4, I get the same guy I would have taken at #1 – plus I get some additional value from the other team.

Alternately, perhaps I trade a 2nd round pick for an aging veteran for a playoff push.

Draft picks could become currency, and allow a lot more trades to occur. Some opponents say that this would not be a panacea. OK, sure. But I haven’t heard anyone making a solid argument that it would hurt any teams. If there is a good chance of it helping some teams, and a very small chance of it hurting anyone, do it! This is a great cost/benefit scenario.

2. The “down without contact” rule in NCAA football. A player can trip over his own feet, 20 yards from the nearest defender, and he is immediately down. Come on, people, this makes no sense. I can understand this in cases where the player is at the risk of injuries, but there are many cases where a player could easily jump up and continue running.

1. The designated hitter. Don’t get me started on this one …

Coors Field Hangover

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As many of you know, I have been trying to determine if the Rockies have a significantly different LD rate at home vs. road. To me, this would indicate a Coors Hangover with breaking balls (they would break more sharply on the road, and the Rockies would need to adjust for that after seeing flat breaking balls at home).

I found what I needed in baseball-reference.com’s PI section. I took the raw data and massaged it to force it to give up its secrets.

Here is the data. Strikeouts, bunts, and fielder’s choices are excluded from the rates. There were only 8 FC all year, so they are statistically insignificant. Bunts were excluded because the hitter is not trying put good wood on the ball. Since I only included at bats, sac flies are not included (they are PAs, but not ABs)

Without further ado:

5557 total at bats.
Overall
4270 full swing BIP
Ground: 1861 – 43.6%
Fly – 1499 – 35.1%
Line: 910 – 21.3%

Home:
2153 full swing BIP
Ground: 906 – 42.1%
Fly – 751 – 34.9%
Line – 496 – 23%

Road:
2117 full swing BIP
Ground: 955 – 45.1%
Fly: 748 – 35.3%
Line: 414 – 19.6%

Analysis:
3.4% more balls in play are hit for line drive in Coors than on the Road. Line drive are very commonly hits (I haven’t calculated BA for the various types yet) so the extra LDs are going to boost BA and slugging.

Also, Rockies hitters struck out 651 times on the road vs. 549 on the road. It seems logical that this is due to more sharply breaking moving pitches, although there might be other explanations.

The extra 100 BIP at home (due to the fewer Ks) would result in 30 extra hits (assuming a BABIP of .300) – or an extra 0.4 hits/game.

I have not run the numbers for any other teams, so I’m not sure if this is a typical home/road split of not. I’ll probably run the numbers for the rest of the NL West to get a decent baseline.

Baseball Free agent Compensation

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Major league baseball uses the Elias Bureau’s ratings to determine type A and type B free agents. (If you have no idea what I’m talking about, you should probably just skip this post). The components of the rankings are supposed to be secret, but they’re really not. In fact, one blogger – Eddie Bajek at Tigers Thoughts – believes he has pretty much cracked the formula (although he is humble enough to admit that he is likely to tag a few guys incorrectly). Eddie has shared a lot of his thought process on his blog, and I think he’ll be pretty close with most of the players.

The Elias rankings are flawed for a large number of reasons. To save time, I’ll just point out three. Ballpark effects are not taken into account. 50 homers in Coors are treated the same as 50 homers in Shea. Age/injury status are not taken into account. A 42 year old facing off-season surgery is treated the same as a 28 year old who is healthy as an ox – although the 28 year old is likely to be a better player in future years. Finally, some of the stats are just bizarre. Fielding percentage for catchers is a particular amusing stat. Catchers are awarded a putout on a strikeout – thus, catchers for teams with pitchers who have high strikeout rates get an artificial boost to their fielding percentage.

My suggestion is to scrap the entire Elias system. Instead, focus on a better measure of value. Money. If I can get 10M/yr and you can get 5M/yr, I am twice as valuable – regardless of what Elias says. Hence, my former team should receive a higher level of compensation.

How, then, do we determine type A and type B? By figuring out where their salary fits into the MLB salary structure.

Here’s one thought. Obviously, this is a rough draft, and not a final product.

Step 1: Calculate the salaries for every on MLB 25 man rosters at the end of the year. Include prorated salary bonuses and incentives that were earned.

Step 2: Determine the 90th and 80th percentile. The 90th percentile would be the cutoff for type A and the 80th percentile would be the cutoff for type B. (Obviously, this could be tweaked).

Step 3: OK, this is the hard part. What, exactly, do we measure? Total value of the contract? Average salary? Obviously, we want to avoid having teams game the system. I’ll take a stab at it.

NOTE: This refers to the player’s NEW contract, not the expiring contract.

A: Only begin this process if the team loses the player submits a request for compensation. There is not point in going through this process for a 40 year old utility infielder.

B: Determine which incentives are likely to be achieved, and add these to the base salary. I believe the NFL does this for salary cap purposes, so I believe that MLB should be able to handle this.

C: Determine how many “significant” years exist within the contract. For example, let’s assume a contract is structure this way:

Year 1: 20M
Year 2: 20M
Year 3: 20M
Year 4: 500K

Clearly, year 4 is not a significant year within the contract. Let’s set the cutoff as 70% of the highest salary. This, if the highest salary that is expected to be earned under the salary is 10M, only years with salaries of 7M or more would be counted.

[Note: this step probably seems strange. It is just in place to avoid having teams add empty years to the contract to spread the signing bonus over more years (see step D)]

D: Prorate the signing bonus over the significant years. If the contract is 10 actual years (5 significant years) and has a 50M signing bonus, we would prorate the 50M over the 5 significant years – adding 10M to each salary. We would have to determine how to handle option years. My initial thought would be to simply not include them at all.

E: Look at the salaries we end up with after jumping through these hoops. Is the highest salary at the 90th percentile? Then the player is a type A free agent. If the highest salary is at the 80th percentile, the player is a type B free agent.

F: Have MLB’s arbitrator settle any disputes.

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